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Note
Particulars of Particularity: Alleging Scienter
and the Proper Application of Rule 9(b) to DutyBased Misrepresentations
Morwenna Borden*
On February 7, 2003, the lives of Thomas, Roberta, and
their daughter Tammy Eames were irreversibly changed when
1
all three were injured in a car accident. After their automobile
insurance company denied the full coverage to the Eames, they
brought a negligent misrepresentation claim in Delaware court,
2
later removed to federal court. The Eames’s claim asserted
that the language defining coverage limits in the insurer’s poli3
cy was misleading. The case was dismissed for failure to meet
the heightened pleading standard set forth for fraud in Federal
4
Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b). On appeal, the Third Circuit af5
firmed dismissal, so the Eames family petitioned the United

* J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School. Special thanks
to Professor Prentiss Cox for his invaluable assistance in the writing process
and for his mentorship throughout my law school career. Many thanks are also due the editors and staff of Minnesota Law Review for the many long hours
they have spent poring over the substance and form of my written words.
Lastly, but first and foremost among my supporters, eternal gratitude to Brian
Younglove for continual encouragement, unwavering devotion, and the oftdelivered hot meal to sustain me throughout the writing process. Copyright ©
2014 by Morwenna Borden.
1. Eames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 346 F. App'x 859, 860 (3d Cir.
2009).
2. Id.
3. The Eames’s personal injury protection was termed “full.” The fullest
protection available through their insurance company was $100,000 per person. Eames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 04-1324-JJF-LPS, 2008 WL
4455743, at *11–12 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2008), aff’d, 346 F. App’x 859. The actual
coverage their “full” personal injury protection coverage provided was $15,000
per person, the statutory minimum in Delaware. Id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN.
Tit. 21, § 2118(a)(2)(b) (2012).
4. Eames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 04-1324-KAJ, 2006
WL 2506640 (D. Del. Aug. 29, 2006), aff'd, 346 F. App'x 859.
5. Eames, 346 F. App'x at 859.
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6

States Supreme Court for further review. In March 2010, the
Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, ultimately
denying the family the possibility of full recompense for their
injuries based on the pleading standard assumed to be required
7
by their claim.
The Eames family’s case highlights an emerging split in
the federal circuit courts regarding the proper pleading stand8
ard for negligent misrepresentation claims. Claims of negligent misrepresentation and fraud by omission are generally
9
held to be derivatives of fraud. Rule 9(b) clearly governs the
appropriate pleading standard for fraud claims: they must be
10
alleged with particularity. However, courts are divided over
the correct pleading standard for duty-based misrepresentation
11
claims, particularly negligent misrepresentation. Approxi6. The petition for certiorari was, in part, an effort to resolve a circuit
split as to whether the heightened pleading standard applies to claims brought
under state consumer protection acts, which are provable on a showing of negligent misrepresentation. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13–16, Eames v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 346 F. App’x 859 (3d Cir. 2009) (No. 09-809).
7. Eames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 1006 (2010).
8. This is not an isolated case. Claims of negligent misrepresentation are
routinely dismissed for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements. During a single six-month period from October 2012 to April 2013,
there were 126 cases throughout the United States in which the defendant
moved to dismiss a negligent misrepresentation claim on Rule 9(b) grounds.
See, e.g., Gardner v. RSM & A Foreclosure Servs., LLC, No. 12-CV-2666-JAMAC, 2013 WL 1129392 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (motion granted); Chapman v.
Abbott Labs., 930 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2013) (motion granted); Sovis v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., Civ. No. 12-2027 DWF/LIB, 2013 WL
440215 (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2013) (motion granted); Rankine v. Roller Bearing
Co. of Am., Inc., No. 12-CV-2065-IEG BLM, 2013 WL 55802 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 2,
2013) (motion granted); Razi v. Razavi, No. 5:12-CV-80-OC-34PRL, 2012 WL
7801361 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2012) (motion granted); Howard v. J.P. Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV12-0952-PHX DGC, 2012 WL 6589330 (D. Ariz. Dec.
17, 2012) (motion granted); Montes v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, Civ. No. 3:12-CV-1999M-BK, 2012 WL 6625379 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2012) (motion granted); Shapouri
v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-1133-JM JMA, 2012 WL 5285910 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 22, 2012) (motion granted).
9. See, e.g., PETER A. ALEES, LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS § 2:15
(2013) (stating that negligent misrepresentation is a form of fraud); 37 C.J.S.
Fraud § 33 (2013) (“Fraud by omission is a subcategory of fraud.”).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
11. A fraud-by-omission or fraud-by-concealment claim “can succeed without the same level of [pleading] specificity” a normal fraud claim requires. In
re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, &
Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1189 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Baggett v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (C.D. Cal. 2007); 35A C.J.S.
Federal Civil Procedure § 307 (2013). See infra notes 12–13 and accompanying
text.
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mately half the circuits hold that Rule 9(b) is applicable to neg12
ligent misrepresentation claims, while others hold that Rule
13
8(a) governs. Rule 8(a) only requires the pleader to include “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plead14
er is entitled to relief.” In contrast, when claiming fraud, Rule
9(b) requires that “a party must state with particularity the
15
circumstances constituting fraud.”
This Note discusses the similarities and differences between actual fraud and the duty-based misrepresentation family of claims, including negligent misrepresentation and fraud
by omission. Part I examines the legal and historical background of pleading generally, and the heightened pleading
standard set forth in Rule 9(b). Part I continues with a review
of actual fraud and the duty-based claims of negligent misrepresentation and fraud by omission. Part II analyzes the purposes of the heightened pleading standard as they relate to dutybased misrepresentation claims and concludes that the proposed policies that ground heightened pleading for intentional
fraud claims do not justify particularized pleading for dutybased misrepresentation claims. Part III discusses the circuit
split in relation to the guiding principle that Rule 9(b) is correctly applied where the claim or allegation sounds in fraud.
Part III continues with a survey of the current formulations
that define when a claim sounds in fraud and concludes that
scienter is a required element for an allegation to sound in
fraud. This Note proposes that causes of action that include scienter and allegations of an intent to deceive sound in fraud and
should be held to the heightened pleading requirement, while

12. See Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239,
248 (6th Cir. 2012) (Kentucky law); Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020, 1028
(8th Cir. 2010) (Minnesota law); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co.,
404 F.3d 566, 579 (2d Cir. 2005); Dist. 1199P Health & Welfare Plan v.
Janssen, LP, 784 F. Supp. 2d 508, 532 (D.N.J. 2011) (Third Circuit, New Jersey law); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 70, 95 (D. Mass. 1998)
(First Circuit).
13. See Balt. Cnty. v. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App'x 914, 921 (4th Cir.
2007); Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d
824, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2007) (Illinois law); Am. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Hamilton
Lane Advisors, Inc., 115 F. App'x 662, 668 (5th Cir. 2004); City of Raton v.
Ark. River Power Auth., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1143 (D.N.M. 2008) (Tenth Circuit).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also infra notes 20–24 and accompanying
text.
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); see also infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text.
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causes of action that sound in negligence should simply require
a short and plain statement of the claim.
I. THE LEGAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF RULE
9(b) AND MISREPRESENTATION TORTS
Analysis of the proper application of Rule 9(b) must be
grounded in an understanding of pleading generally, the history of the heightened pleading standard, and the rationale underlying the particularity requirement. This Part provides that
background and also examines the elements of fraud, fraud by
omission, and negligent misrepresentation claims. In addition,
the application of the heightened pleading standard by the
courts will be surveyed in relation to each of these causes of action.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PLEADING
Understanding the origins of pleading generally informs
the discussion of how Rule 9(b) applies to duty-based misrepresentation claims. This Section highlights the philosophy underpinning the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the function of
pleadings within that system, the reasoning for the low threshold required for pleadings, and the recent refinement of notice
pleading in the Supreme Court’s rulings in Bell Atlantic v.
16
17
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
The philosophy behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is clearly stated in Rule 1: the rules “should be construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
18
every action.”
The primary purposes of the Federal Rules are to promote
19
justice and facilitate adjudication on the merits of the claim.
20
The function of pleadings under Rule 8(a) is to provide notice.
16. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
17. Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”);
see also Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966) (“The basic
purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice through fair trials . . . . to
get away from some of the old procedural booby traps which common-law
pleaders could set to prevent unsophisticated litigants from ever having their
day in court.”). See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1029 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the policies behind the drafting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
20. See generally 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004) (“Historically, pleadings
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The notice model requires, in the majority of cases, only that
the plaintiff provide a short and plain statement sufficient to
21
notify the defendant of the nature of the claim. The principal
draftsman of the Federal Rules commented that what should be
expected of the pleading was “a general statement distinguishing the case from all others, so that the manner and form of
22
trial and remedy expected are clear.” The fact that the pleading is the gateway to court access justifies this low threshold.
The idea is not to keep litigants out of court, but to let them in.
The Supreme Court has substantially expanded upon the
notice model of pleading in recent years. In Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, the Court noted that a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief “requires more
than labels and conclusions, and “a formulaic recitation of the
23
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal
elaborated upon this standard, stating that “a complaint must
contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” and further commented that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content” that allows the court to reasonably infer
24
the defendant’s liability for the alleged misconduct. This plausibility standard tailors modern notice pleading, and underlies
the additional requirements of Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading
standard.

have served four major functions: (1) giving notice of the nature of a claim or
defense; (2) stating the facts each party believes to exist; (3) narrowing the issues that must be litigated; and (4) providing a means for speedy disposition of
sham claims and insubstantial defenses.”). But see Francis v. Giacomelli, 588
F.3d 186, 192–93 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that the notice pleading characterization may be too simplistic, belying the countervailing policy that litigation is
only open to those plaintiffs whose complaints are justified by both law and
fact).
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). But cf. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988–89 (2003) (arguing that notice pleading is a myth based on the broad exceptions to the notice standard in various
substantive areas of the law).
22. Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last
Phase—Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of
the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 977 (1937).
23. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
24. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 547).
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B. PLEADING WITH PARTICULARITY: THE HEIGHTENED
PLEADING STANDARD OF RULE 9(b)
An informed analysis of Rule 9(b)’s appropriate application
to misrepresentation claims requires an understanding of the
history of the particularity requirement. This Section provides
the historical background for particularized pleading, the transition from English common law to the American Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and comments on the gap between the historical rule and the modern application of Rule 9(b) to fraud
claims. Post hoc rationalizations for the heightened pleading
standard are laid out as possible bases for this exception to notice pleading found in the Federal Rules.
1. History of Particularized Pleading
Rule 9(b)’s heightened standard traces back to English
25
common law pleading rules. Before the merger of law and equity, fraud could not be asserted as an equitable defense to an
26
action at law. Because the litigant had to sue at equity to enjoin enforcement of a law court’s judgment, equity courts re27
quired fraud to be pled with particularity in these cases. During this time period, however, pleading fraud as a cause of
28
action at law did not require the same particularity. At the
time, the reasoning for the heightened standard stemmed from
the judicial desire to protect judgments settled in courts of
29
law. Though the reasoning ceased to fit its application, the
heightened pleading standard came to be applied to fraud
claims in the United States around the turn of the twentieth
century, shortly before the introduction of the Federal Rules of
30
Civil Procedure.

25. 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
PROCEDURE § 1296 (3d ed. 2004) (“This specific pleading requirement
perpetuates the practice that existed at common law . . . .”).
26. William M. Richman et al., The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes Without
Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 966 (1987).
27. Id.
28. Id. The treatises commented on explicitly state that certain causes of
action did require specificity, such as slander, but not fraud. See id.
29. Christopher M. Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers—Strike
Rule 9(b), 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 285 (2004).
30. See, e.g., Chamberlain Mach. Works v. United States, 270 U.S. 347,
349 (1926) (“To show a cause of action it was necessary that the petition state
distinctly the particular acts of fraud . . . .”); Rice v. Wilson, 225 F. 159, 163 (D.
Del. 1915) (“Fraud must be not only particularly alleged but strictly proved.”).

AND
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Remarkably, very little explicit reasoning substantiates
the heightened pleading standard as it is announced in the
Federal Rules. The legislative history on the topic is sparse.
The Advisory Committee notes relating to the adoption of Rule
9 are limited to the cryptic message of “[s]ee English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 19, r.
31
22.” It is apparent that the heightened standard is based on
English procedure, but the Advisory Committee did not provide
further justifications for adopting this particular rule. Rule 9(b)
appears in the first draft of the Federal Rules and has never
32
been substantively amended.
The history of the particularity requirement for fraud is
atypical. There is little connective tissue tying the modern form
to its historical roots, and yet almost no explanation is provided
for its inclusion in the Federal Rules. In one of the few comments that relates directly to the heightened pleading standard, the chief architect of the Federal Rules, Charles E. Clark,
provided a less-than-illuminating commentary on the purpose
of the particularity requirement. Regarding Rule 9(b), he stated
that “[w]hile useful, this rule probably states only what courts
would do anyhow and may not be considered absolutely essen33
tial. Further explanation is needed for this limiting exception
to the general notice pleading paradigm.
2. Post-Hoc Rationalizations of the Particularity Requirement
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the particularity requirement for fraud claims has been rationalized on various grounds. Legal scholars and judges alike assert that defendants’ reputations must be protected from light34
ly made allegations of morally reprehensible acts. Proponents
of the heightened pleading standard also argue that defendants
must be protected from baseless suits filed for nuisance or set35
tlement value. Another justification for particularized plead31. FED. R. CIV. P. 9. The English rule referred to provides: “Fraud must
be distinctly alleged and proved. The acts alleged to be fraudulent must be
stated otherwise no evidence in support of them will be received.” Fairman,
supra note 29, at 287.
32. Richman et al., supra note 26, at 965.
33. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2. F.R.D. 456, 463–64 (1943).
34. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003); 4
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 1296.
35. Adams v. NVR Homes, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 243, 250 (D. Md. 2000); 5A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 1296 (“[U]nfounded fraud claims should
be identified and disposed of early.”).
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ing stems from the desire for finality in settled transactions—
transactions should not be easily reopened for an allegation of
36
fraud. These same scholars claim that to prepare an effective
defense to a claim which embraces a wide variety of potential
conduct, a defendant must be put on notice of the act they are
37
alleged to have performed. The heightened pleading standard
is also defended as a means to deter the filing of suits solely for
discovery purposes, in an effort to discover whether unknown
38
wrongs have occurred in the course of a transaction. In the
absence of legislative history to indicate the rule’s purpose, these post hoc policies underlying the heightened pleading standard stand alone as the foundation for Rule 9(b).
C. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF FRAUD
Rule 9(b), by its language, clearly applies to claims of actual fraud. This Section discusses the elements of a cause of action for fraud, notes the prominence of scienter as a critical
component of the tort of fraud, and reviews the application of
Rule 9(b) by various courts to actual fraud claims. Although the
specific application of heightened pleading is variable, courts
consistently require some particularized facts to be alleged in a
claim of actual fraud.
A separate cause of action for fraud originated from the in39
dependent tort of deceit. This deceit-based history clearly
points to scienter, the intent to deceive, as the cornerstone ele40
ment in an action for fraud. The ordinary elements comprising
a fraud claim are: (1) a false material assertion; (2) scienter; (3)
the intent to induce reliance on the assertion; (4) justifiable re-

36. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 325
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 1296 (“The utility of
promoting stability in economic transactions has considerable force and might
be compromised if fraud claims were easy to assert.”).
37. Cresencia v. Kim, 878 P.2d 725, 733 (Haw. App. 1994); 5A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 25, § 1296 (“[A] defendant needs a substantial amount of
particularized information about the plaintiff's claim in order to enable him to
understand it and effectively prepare a responsive pleading and an overall defense of the actions.”).
38. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 1296.
39. YOUNG B. SMITH & WILLIAM L. PROSSER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS (2d ed. 1957), cited in V. John Ella, Common Law Fraud Claims: A
Critical Tool for Litigators, BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 2006, at 18, 19.
40. See also, Frank J. Cavico, Fraudulent, Negligent, and Innocent Misrepresentation in the Employment Context: The Deceitful, Careless, and
Thoughtless Employer, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 34 (1997).

1118

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:1110
41

liance; and (5) damages resulting from the reliance. In this
context, scienter is defined as the intention “to deceive, manip42
ulate, or defraud.” The element of scienter differentiates fraud
43
from all other misrepresentations. Scienter cannot be inferred
from facts which prove only a materially false or misleading
statement; rather, there must be a relation of factual falsity to
44
a deceptive state of mind.
When applicable, Rule 9(b) trumps Rule 8(a). Therefore, it
is Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard that applies to
claims of fraud, not the bare notice pleading set forth in Rule
45
8(a). When fraud is alleged, Rule 8(a) is supplemented with
the requirement that the circumstances be pled with particu46
larity. Although courts vary in their precise application of the
47
heightened pleading standard to claims of fraud , a plaintiff
generally satisfies the particularity requirement by stating who
made the representation, what was represented, where and
when the representation was made, and how it was fraudu48
lent. The complaint need not enumerate all the evidence or
plea with such a degree of particularity that general discovery
49
methods would be replaced. In addition, Rule 9(b) allows intent and other conditions of a person’s mind to be alleged gen-

41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526, 531, 537, 549 (1999).
42. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1999). Scienter is designated
as the condition under which a misrepresentation is fraudulent. See id.
44. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1797 (2010).
45. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (explaining that unless fraud or mistake are
alleged, Rule 8(a) notice pleading is the governing standard).
46. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 1297 (“[T]he rule is a special
pleading requirement and contrary to the general approach of the ‘short and
plain,’ simplified pleading . . . .”).
47. Compare Abels v. Farmers Commodities Corp., 259 F.3d 910, 921 (8th
Cir. 2001) (holding that it is only fair to allow discovery before requiring the
plaintiff to plead facts that remain within the defendant’s knowledge), and
Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc. of Peoria, 142 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.
1998) (“[T]he particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) must be relaxed where the
plaintiff lacks access to all the facts necessary to detail his claim . . . .”), with
Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 444 (1st Cir. 1985) (The particularity requirements must be met, “even when the fraud relates to matters peculiarly
within the knowledge of the opposing party.” (quoting Wayne Inv., Inc. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 739 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1984)).
48. See United States ex rel. Costner v. United States, 317 F.3d 883, 888
(8th Cir. 2003).
49. Graphic Techs., Inc. v. Pitney Bowes Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1174, 1178 (D.
Kan. 1998).
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51

erally —scienter need not be pled with specificity. However,
courts have held that the plaintiff must set forth specific facts
that make it reasonable to believe that the defendants knew
52
the statements were false or misleading.
Courts have found numerous ways for a fraud claim to
meet the particularity requirement. The First Circuit allowed a
fraud claim to proceed where the complaint did not describe the
frauds with sufficient particularity, but the plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion for summary judgment and related discovery
material cited gave sufficient notice of the fraudulent acts al53
leged . . . .”
The Third Circuit also carved out an exception to the particularity requirement, holding that the date, place, and time of
the fraud need not be alleged, as long as the plaintiff uses “an
‘alternative means of injecting precision and some measure of
54
substantiation into their allegations of fraud.’”
Courts are equally creative when dismissing a complaint
on particularity grounds. One court dismissed a complaint, despite the fact it described a speaker’s statements with particularity, holding that “January, 1996” does not allege the time of
55
the statement in a sufficiently particular manner. Others
have held that the complaint must contain specific identifica56
tion of documents comprising the false statements. These variations in procedure lead to frustration for parties, judges, and
57
legal scholars alike. Yet, these relatively minor difficulties in
applying heightened pleading to actual fraud claims are magnified when it comes to pleading related, yet distinct, causes of
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
51. Id.
52. In re Segue Software, Inc. Sec. Litig., 106 F. Supp. 2d 161, 165 (D.
Mass. 2000).
53. Bonilla v. Trebol Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998).
54. Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 658 (3d
Cir. 1998) (quoting Seville Indus. Mach. v. Southmost Mach., 742 F.2d 786,
791 (3d Cir. 1984)).
55. Learning Express, Inc. v. Ray-Matt Enters., 74 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.
Mass. 1999).
56. Elster v. Alexander, 75 F.R.D. 458, 461–62 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
57. E.g., In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467
F. Supp. 227, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (“No court has enunciated a [particularity]
test which casts light beyond the facts before it.”); Jeff Sovern, Reconsidering
Federal Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized Pleading Requirements in
Fraud Cases?, 104 F.R.D. 143, 179 (1985) (“Rule 9(b) should be eliminated
from the federal civil rules. . . . Too often, Rule 9(b) motions are just another
obstacle to the speedy resolution of a case.”).
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action that are not enumerated in the text of Rule 9(b), and at
their heart are grounded in duty rather than scienter.
D. DUTY-BASED MISREPRESENTATION: A PRIMER ON FRAUD BY
OMISSION AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS
American jurisprudence recognizes a continuum for claims
of misrepresentation. At one end is actual fraud, based in scien58
ter. At the opposite end of the spectrum are innocent misrepresentation claims that do not require either knowledge that
the misrepresentation was false or intent to induce reliance on
59
the misrepresentation. Roughly in the center of the continuum are misrepresentations that are based in duty, such as
60
fraud by omission and negligent misrepresentation. This Section discusses both fraud by omission and negligent misrepresentation claims, focusing on the elements of each tort and the
courts’ application of Rule 9(b) to each cause of action.
1. Fraud by Omission
Unlike actual fraud, which hinges on an affirmative misstatement, a fraud by omission claim is grounded in an unful61
filled duty to disclose. To prevail on a fraud by omission claim,
the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant had a duty to
disclose the material fact at issue; (2) the defendant failed to
disclose the fact; (3) the defendant’s failure to disclose the material fact induced the plaintiff to act; and (4) the plaintiff suf62
fered actual damages as a result of the nondisclosure. Fraud
by omission is sometimes conflated with fraudulent conceal63
ment. However, fraudulent concealment requires the additional element of scienter, which is not an element of fraud by
64
omission. The two claims are neither equivalent nor interchangeable.
The duty to disclose arises in a variety of situations. There
are at least three types of relationships which can give rise to a
58. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 107, 741 (5th ed. 1984).
59. Id. at 748‒49.
60. Addressing the proper pleading standard for innocent misrepresentations is beyond the scope of this paper.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1999).
62. Id. § 551.
63. See Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 194 (M.D.N.C.
1997) (using fraud by omission and fraudulent concealment interchangeably).
64. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 582 (2d
Cir. 2005).
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duty to disclose material facts. The first is a formal fiduciary
65
66
relationship, the second is a confidential relationship, and
67
the third is a trilogy created in arm’s length transactions.
In contrast to affirmative representations, fraud by omission can be very difficult to plead with particularity. By its very
nature, it is a claim of non-action. It is puzzling to explain how
a plaintiff can plead who, what, where, how, and when a nonaction occurred. No courts have completely abrogated the necessity for pleading with particularity, but a fraud by omission
claim can succeed without the same degree of specificity that
68
an actual fraud claim requires.
The pleading standard required in a fraud by omission
claim is varied. Some courts require that a plaintiff claiming
fraud by omission need only allege the facts that were not dis69
closed and the source of the duty to speak with particularity.
Other courts require the complaint to reasonably allege what
the omission entailed, the person responsible for the failure to
disclose, the context of the omissions and the manner in which
they misled the plaintiff, and what the defendant obtained
70
through the omission. One court has expanded this requirement to include particularity regarding the relationship giving
rise to the duty to speak, the reason for the materiality of the
omission, and why reliance on the omission was both reasona-

65. Id.; D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1412 (2002) (“Formal fiduciary relationships are those
well-settled cases—such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, partnerpartner, director-shareholder, and attorney-client—where fiduciary duties apply as a matter of course.”).
66. Smith, supra note 65, at 1412–14 (“Informal fiduciary relationships—
often referred to as ‘confidential relationships’—are those in which the court
imposes fiduciary duties based on a qualitative evaluation of the relationship . . . . [T]he common elements are quite simple: (1) ‘trust’ or ‘confidence’
reposed by one person in another; and (2) the resulting ‘domination,’ ‘superiority,’ or ‘undue influence’ of the other.”).
67. “(1) When one voluntarily discloses information, he has a duty to disclose the whole truth; (2) when one makes a representation, he has a duty to
disclose new information when he is aware the new information makes the
earlier representation misleading or untrue; and (3) when one makes a partial
disclosure and conveys a false impression, he has a duty to speak.” Four Bros.
Boat Works, Inc. v. Tesoro Petroleum Co., 217 S.W.3d 653, 670–71 (Tex. App.
2006).
68. Falk v. Gen. Motors Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1099 (N.D. Cal.
2007).
69. 27 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 62:146 (2008).
70. Weaver v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.R.D. 96, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Adler v.
Berg Harmon Assocs., 816 F. Supp. 919, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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71

ble and detrimental. Still other courts hold that “relaxed Rule
72
9(b) analysis” applies to claims of fraud by omission.
2. Negligent Misrepresentation
Negligent misrepresentation claims are governed by the
principles of negligence: reasonableness, duty, breach, and
damages. Negligent misrepresentation does not contain the requirement of an intent to deceive and is “therefore technically
73
not fraud.” It is also unlike fraud by omission in that the duty
owed arises only in a transactional context, rather than from a
74
special relationship between the parties.
The archetypal elements of negligent misrepresentation
are: (1) the misrepresentation must be made in the course of
business, profession, or employment, or another transaction in
which the speaker has a pecuniary interest; (2) the representation must supply false information; (3) there must have been
justifiable reliance on the false information supplied; and (4)
the party accused of the misrepresentation must have failed to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or com75
municating the information. The scope of negligent misrepresentation is narrow because it is premised on the reasonable
expectations of a foreseeable user of information supplied in a
76
transactional context.
The Circuit Courts have vastly divergent views over the
appropriate pleading standard for negligent misrepresentation
claims. The different pleading standards arise from a fundamental philosophical difference in the way the Circuits view
negligent misrepresentation. Those that apply Rule 9(b) hold
that negligent misrepresentation claims are claims of fraud, or

71. Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 195 (M.D.N.C.
1997).
72. Robinson v. Fountainhead Title Grp. Corp., 447 F. Supp. 2d 478, 490
(D. Md. 2006).
73. R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the
Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1789, 1820 (2000) (distinguishing negligent misrepresentation
from fraud based on the lack of a “concomitant element of an actual intent to
deceive”); V. John Ella, Common Law Fraud Claims: A Critical Tool for Litigators, BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 2006, at 18, 20. But see 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 74
(2013) (“An action for negligent misrepresentation is an action for fraud.”).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1999).
75. Id.
76. Id. at cmt. a.
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sound in fraud; those who apply Rule 8(a) hold that they are
77
claims of negligence, not grounded in fraud.
In holding that the heightened pleading standard does not
apply to claims of negligent misrepresentation, courts have argued that negligent misrepresentation “does not contain an es78
79
sential showing of fraud”; “is not governed by . . . Rule 9(b)”;
80
is not enumerated in Rule 9(b); and “as its name suggests, [is]
81
grounded in negligence rather than fraud.” By comparison, in
holding that the heightened pleading standard does apply to
negligent misrepresentation, courts have argued that an allegation of negligent misrepresentation is simply an allegation of
82
fraud or that an action for negligent misrepresentation sounds
83
in fraud rather than negligence.
The Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuits are exceptions to the84
se general rules. In an anomalous combination of philosophies, the Sixth Circuit acknowledges that Kentucky law suggests that negligent misrepresentation is not an allegation of
fraud, yet still holds that the heightened pleading standard applies because such an allegation implicates Rule 9(b)’s pur85
pose. The Ninth Circuit relies primarily on the conduct alleged, rather than the nature of the claim to determine whether
heightened pleading is necessary. Allegations “of fraudulent
conduct must satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of
Rule 9(b). Allegations of non-fraudulent conduct need satisfy
86
only the ordinary notice pleading standards of Rule 8(a).”
The history of the heightened pleading standard and the
justifications surrounding its adoption into the Federal Rules
do not provide much guidance for courts applying Rule 9(b) to
misrepresentation claims. The historical basis for Rule 9(b)
77. See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
78. Baltimore Cnty. v. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App'x 914, 921 (4th Cir.
2007).
79. Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d
824, 833 (7th Cir. 2007).
80. Am. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Hamilton Lane Advisors, Inc., 115 F. App'x
662, 668 (5th Cir. 2004).
81. City of Raton v. Ark. River Power Auth., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1143
(D.N.M. 2008).
82. Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 2010).
83. Souran v. Travelers Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 1497, 1511 (11th Cir. 1993).
84. See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
85. Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239, 247–
48 (6th Cir. 2012).
86. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003).
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heightened pleading in fraud claims is uncertain. With this
backdrop of historical and post-hoc heightened pleading rationales, federal courts apply Rule 9(b) differently for fraud, fraud
by omission, and negligent misrepresentation. For fraud by
omission and negligent misrepresentation, courts are split on
whether to apply notice pleading or Rule 9(b). A clear standard
is needed to apprise plaintiffs of the requirements for their
pleading and to guide courts in their determination of the appropriate pleading standard.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE
PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT TO DUTY-BASED
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS
Shaping a workable pleading standard for duty-based misrepresentation claims entails an analysis of the claims’ elements and how the elements relate to the purposes of the
heightened pleading standard set forth in Rule 9(b). Courts
have clearly determined that the making of a false statement is
not per se a matter that Rule 9(b) requires to be specially
88
pleaded. Thus the pleading standard for each type of misrepresentation claim must be determined by reference to the element in each that differentiates it from the others. The critical
89
component of a fraud claim is scienter. The crux of a fraud by
omission claim is the special relationship between the parties
90
that gives rise to a duty to disclose. The root of a negligent
misrepresentation claim is that the defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care in obtaining and communicating information in
91
a transactional context.
The following sections analyze the four most oft-repeated
policy arguments for the heightened pleading standard in light
of the key components of fraud, fraud by omission, and negligent misrepresentation. This Part argues that the Circuit split
belies general adherence to a vague standard used to fix the
pleading standard. The principle underpinning the apparent
split holds that allegations that sound in fraud are properly
87. See supra Part I.B.
88. John P. Villano Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 130, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(“[N]othing in the language or history of Rule 9(b) suggests that it is intended
to apply, willy-nilly, to every . . . tort that includes an element of false statement.”).
89. See supra Part I.C.
90. See supra Part I.D.1.
91. See supra Part I.D.2.
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governed by Rule 9(b) while allegations that are grounded in
negligence only need to satisfy Rule 8(a).
A. FINALITY OF SETTLED TRANSACTIONS DICTATES THAT THEY
SHOULD NOT BE LIGHTLY REOPENED FOR AN ALLEGATION OF
FRAUD
The historic explanation for the heightened pleading requirement for fraud claims is to protect judgments and settled
92
transactions. Protecting settled transactions is not a persuasive reason to require heightened pleading for duty-based
claims. Legal scholars have noted that Rule 9(b) “probably originated in equity pleading and reflected a reluctance to upset or
investigate judgments, settled accounts and other completed
93
transactions.” This policy has its roots in the historical rationale for heightened pleading in the English jurisprudential
94
separation between courts of equity and courts of law. Since
the merger of the two, fraud is no longer raised as defense to
the judgment of a court of law in a separate court of equity, so
95
the historical rationale is inapplicable.
A modern corollary justification has been asserted for the
historical heightened pleading policy. Charges of fraud frequently request courts to rewrite the parties’ contract or other96
wise disrupt established contractual relationships. Since
“[t]he utility of promoting stability in economic transactions
has considerable force and might be compromised if fraud
97
claims were easy to assert,” some courts are reluctant to reopen settled transactions without particularized pleading for
98
fraud cases.
This justification takes for granted that stability in economic transactions would be undermined by the mere pleading
of fraud. Even though stability in economic transactions could
be undermined by the setting aside of numerous transactions
92. John P. Villano, 176 F.R.D. at 131.
93. Richman et al., supra note 26, at 967.
94. John P. Villano, 176 F.R.D. at 131. (“The requirement traces back to
common law presumptions of caveat emptor and to the reluctance of English
courts to reopen settled transactions.”).
95. See supra Part I.B.
96. Ackerman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1999).
97. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, at § 1296.
98. See, e.g., Stearns v. Page, 48 U.S. 819, 829 (1849). Particularity is required for fraud claims that seek to reopen a settled transaction “so that the
court may rectify it with a feeling of certainty that they are not committing
another, and perhaps greater, mistake.” See id.
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based on fraudulent conduct, this would tend to deter parties
from transacting in a fraudulent manner, a respectable result.
For duty-based misrepresentations, it is even more difficult to
assess how pleading the claim alone could destabilize economic
transactions. Additionally, modern courts are much more willing to reopen settled transactions than they once were, espe99
cially in the context of misrepresentations. Therefore, further
justification of the heightened pleading requirement is necessary for its application to duty-based misrepresentation claims.
B. THE DEFENDANTS’ REPUTATION MUST BE PROTECTED FROM
CLAIMS THAT MORALLY REPREHENSIBLE ACTS HAVE BEEN
COMMITTED
The most consistently recited purpose of Rule 9(b) is to pro100
tect the defendant’s reputation. The necessity of protecting a
defendant’s reputation is recognized in cases of actual fraud.
Claiming that a defendant intended to deceive, manipulate, or
mislead a plaintiff is a weighty allegation that could cause serious harm to a defendant’s reputation and goodwill. It would be
prejudicial to allow plaintiffs to allege unfounded claims of
fraud where the allegation alone could harm the defendant’s
101
reputation or business.
Although this policy plainly applies to fraud claims, its application to duty-based misrepresentation claims is less clear
since, by their nature, they lack the same level of moral reprehensibility. In addition, Rule 9(b) does not deter plaintiffs from
102
filing complaints due to its unpredictable application. Moreover, dismissal on Rule 9(b) grounds may not vindicate a defendant’s reputation, as the dismissal is likely to be viewed as
103
dismissal on a technicality, rather than on the merits.
99. Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims with Particularity Under Rule
9(b), 97 HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1439 (1984) (“[C]ontemporary courts generally do
not even express concern about reopening completed transactions.”).
100. E.g., Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003); S2 Automation LLC
v. Micron Tech., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 487, 494 (D.N.M. 2012).
101. Richard G. Himelrick, Pleading Securities Fraud, 43 MD. L. REV. 342,
368–69 (1984) (“Suggestions of fraud tarnish reputations and denigrate the
goodwill of businesses. Professionals are particularly vulnerable to these
charges. Irreparable loss of standing and prestige may befall [one] who is
linked with a fraudulent scheme through attenuated allegations that may
take years to disprove.”).
102. See Sovern, supra note 57, at 171–72.
103. Id. at 173 (arguing that reputational protection is not a sufficient policy on which to base heightened pleading in fraud cases).
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In addition, Rule 9(b) may not protect the reputations and
goodwill of defendants because the unpredictability of the
Rule’s application does not deter plaintiffs from filing complaints. Arguably, once the complaint has been filed, the harm
has been done. But Rule 9(b) will not function as an effective
104
deterrent if it is not applied effectively and uniformly. Rule
9(b)’s application is unpredictable at best, not only for claims of
negligent misrepresentation and fraud by omission, but even in
105
claims of actual fraud. Because of the lack of a clear standard
by which to measure an allegation of negligent misrepresentation or fraud by omission, a plaintiff will often be unable to determine whether the complaint will satisfy the particularity requirements. Thus, application of the heightened pleading
standard to duty-based misrepresentation claims is unlikely to
deter plaintiffs from filing claims based on these causes of action.
Most significantly, the derogation of a duty does not carry
the moral opprobrium associated with an explicit intent to deceive, regardless of whether the setting is purely transactional,
as in a negligent misrepresentation claim, or the setting is defined by a confidential or fiduciary relationship, in a fraud by
omission claim. Even if defendants counter that these dutybased claims do carry some reputational damage, torts such as
battery and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress
carry far more moral reprehensibility, yet a heightened plead106
ing standard is not applied to those claims. Although this policy may justify heightened pleading in cases of actual fraud,
reputational harm alone is not a sufficient justification for requiring particularized pleading for duty-based misrepresentation claims.
C. DEFENDANTS MUST BE PROTECTED FROM BASELESS SUITS
FILED FOR NUISANCE OR SETTLEMENT VALUE
Numerous courts have asserted that a principal aim of
Rule 9(b) is to preclude the use of groundless fraud claims as a
104. Id. at 171–72.
105. See supra Parts I.C‒I.D.
106. Intentional infliction of severe emotional distress claims require that
the conduct “must be so extreme in degree and so outrageous in character as
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and be regarded as atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Williamson v. Am. Nat’l. Ins. Co.,
695 F. Supp. 2d 431, 456 (S.D. Tex. 2010). Heightened pleading is required only for claims of fraud and mistake. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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pretext to discovering a wrong or as a strike suit. Courts contend that “Rule 9[(b)] operates to diminish the possibility that a
plaintiff with a largely groundless claim will be able to simply
take up the time of [defendants] . . . with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement val108
ue . . . .” Defendants should be protected from strike suits;
however, protecting the defendant from baseless suits is not the
109
business of Rule 9(b).
Courts are most lenient with the particularity requirement
in those precise instances where this policy presupposes they
should be most rigid, where information is uniquely within the
110
possession of the alleged misrepresenter. Additionally, as this
justification relates to fraud by omission, the key element is the
111
duty to disclose due to a special relationship. Discovery is not
likely to yield this information where it is not already available
112
to the complaining party. Therefore, this policy does not substantiate particularized pleading for claims of fraud by omission. For negligent misrepresentation claims, the critical element to be alleged is dereliction of a duty in comparison to a
107. E.g., New Eng. Data Servs., Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 289 (1st Cir.
1987); Driscoll v. Landmark Bank for Sav., 758 F. Supp. 48, 52 (D. Mass.
1991). A “strike suit” is an action making largely groundless claims to justify
conducting extensive and costly discovery with the hope of forcing the defendant to settle at a premium to avoid the costs of the discovery. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a strike suit as one “based on no valid claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable
or inflated settlement”).
108. Wayne Inv., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 739 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1984)
(quoting Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.1979)).
109. Rule 12(b)(6) is specifically suited to this purpose. Yoichiro Hamabe,
Functions of Rule 12(b)(6) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Categorization Approach, 15 CAMPBELL L. REV. 119, 127–28 (1993) (stating that the
purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint,
achieve early resolution of cases on the merits, and resolve and screen out
unmeritorious cases at the pleading stage).
110. Peters v. Amoco Oil Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 1999)
(holding that the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) “may be relaxed somewhat if the defendant controls information required for proper
pleading” (quoting United States ex rel. Sanders v. E. Ala. Healthcare Auth.,
953 F. Supp. 1404, 1413 (M.D. Ala. 1996))); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 755 F.
Supp. 1040, 1052 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (noting that the particularity requirement of
Rule 9(b) “is relaxed somewhat” when the factual information is “peculiarly
within the defendant’s knowledge or control”).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1999).
112. Cf. Falk v. Gen. Motors Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1098–99 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) (noting that pleading fraud by omission will be more difficult because of the nature of the claim).
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standard of reasonableness in a transactional setting. Again,
discovery will not magically generate this duty if the plaintiff
cannot first establish it.
There are other, more effective means of protecting defendants from baseless suits, such as Rules 11, 12(b)(6), 12(c),
and 56. Rule 11 requires that that the parties and/or attorneys
certify that the pleading is not being presented for any improper purpose, thus regulating the filing of strike suits by imposing sanctions, which may include attorney’s fees, on parties
114
who file for improper purposes. Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate where the plaintiff has failed to state a legit115
imate claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(c) allows for a judgment on the pleadings, requiring, much like Rule
12(b)(6), that the complaint “contain[s] factual allegations that
raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the as116
sumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.”
Summary judgment is also available to deal with strike suits
under Rule 56, where discovery does not uncover sufficient evi117
dence upon which to base the claim.
The numerous avenues for protecting defendants from nuisance suits diminish the potency of this policy’s requirement for
heightened pleading. It may be argued that there is purposeful
overlap in the functions of the Federal Rules; just because there
are other Rules that protect against strike suits does not mean
118
that Rule 9(b) cannot also be used. Similar to the need to protect a defendant’s reputation, strike suits are an issue not only
119
for fraud claims, but for a wide variety of claims. Basing the
particularity requirement on the desire to limit strike suits in
this specific context goes beyond the suitable scope of Rule 9(b),
since limiting strike suits is comprehensively dealt with in oth-

113. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). The improper purposes enumerated in the Rule
include harassment, “caus[ing] unnecessary delay, or needlessly increas[ing]
the cost of litigation.” Id. These improper purposes are not exhaustive, rather
they are illustrative. Id. Filing for settlement value would likely fit within the
scope of this Rule.
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). See Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d
26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
118. See Sovern, supra note 57, at 176 (“[I]f Rule 11 is only partially effective in preventing strike suits, as is likely to be the case, Rule 9(b) may still be
thought to have a role to play.”).
119. Richman, supra note 26, at 962‒63.
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120

er Rules. The complications in relying on this justification for
application of the heightened pleading standard to fraud claims
are exponentially increased in the context of duty-based misrepresentation claims, as they are not specifically enumerated
in the Rule. A more persuasive justification is needed to firmly
ground Rule 9(b)’s application to duty-based misrepresentation
claims.
D. DEFENDANTS REQUIRE SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF THE WRONG
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED
Given that notice is the singular policy underlying pleading
generally, it is unsurprising that notice has been relied on as a
justification for the heightened pleading standard in Rule 9(b).
Courts have framed this purpose in various ways. Some state
that the defendant must be given enough information to pre121
pare an effective response or must be advised of the specific
122
claim that it must meet. Others frame the issue such that the
allegations must sufficiently apprise the defendants of the
123
transactions upon which the claim is based.
Historically, pleadings fulfill “several overlapping purposes”: pure notice of the claim, narrowing the issues “so that litigants can ascertain what matters are actually in dispute,” serving as a “permanent record” and “basis for res judicata,”
providing for the “speedy disposition of frivolous claims and defenses,” and “to permit disposition of cases without trial where
124
the facts are not in issue.” But, under American notice pleading, the pleading is only intended to provide enough information so that the opposing party is alerted to the nature of the
125
claim.
The other functions are performed through motion
126
practice and discovery.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal have
precluded plaintiffs from moving forward with suits that fail to
sufficiently give notice of the claim, for all causes of action, not

120. See, e.g., supra note 109 and accompanying text (arguing that Rule
12(b)(6) is an effective way to prevent strike suits).
121. Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557–58 (2d Cir. 1979).
122. United States v. Gill, 156 F. Supp. 955, 957 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
123. B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert’s, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720, 727 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
124. Sovern, supra note 57, at 147–48.
125. See supra Part I.A.
126. Sovern, supra note 57, at 147–48.
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127

just in misrepresentation claims. This is achieved by requiring a pleading to contain more than a formulaic recitation of
the elements of the cause of action, and to allege sufficient factual matter that allows the court to reasonably infer the de128
fendant’s liability. Therefore, relying on the notice justification for the heightened pleadings standard is unnecessary for
duty-based misrepresentation claims. The tailoring of notice
pleading has raised the bar for the notice requirements such
that any allegation of duty-based misrepresentation would, by
meeting the current pleading standard governed by Twombly
and Iqbal, give the defendant sufficient information on which to
129
fashion a defense. Some courts have already agreed that the
purpose of Rule 9(b) is not to give the defendant enough information to prepare his defense, “[a] charge of fraud is no more
130
opaque than any other charge.”
In fact, justifying heightened pleading by the same policy
as notice pleading takes the wind out of the sails of heightened
pleading. If pure notice pleading adequately serves the desired
function, there is no need for heightened pleading at all, not for
intentional fraud, and certainly not for negligent misrepresentation or fraud by omission. Indeed, there is some irony that
the notice rationale, designed as it was to facilitate entry to the
courts, would be used as a justification to dismiss claims before
131
they can even be heard.
E. ALLEGATIONS THAT SOUND IN FRAUD
The Circuit split regarding the appropriate pleading
standard for negligent misrepresentation claims is not as wide
as the contrary decisions lead one to believe. There are a few
courts that baldly assert that Rule 9(b) applies to both negligent misrepresentation claims and fraud by omission claims in
every circumstance, relying purely on the similarities between
duty-based misrepresentation and intentional misrepresenta132
tions. However, the majority of courts rely on a central prin127. See infra note 128.
128. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
129. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
130. Ackerman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“The defendant can get all the information he needs to meet it by filing a contention interrogatory.”).
131. Fairman, supra note 29, at 297.
132. See Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 202 (M.D.N.C.
1997) (holding that Rule 9(b) applies to negligent misrepresentation because
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ciple in issuing their inconsistent opinions. The principle underlying these decisions states that if a complaint alleges a
claim that sounds in fraud, then Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements obtain; if a complaint alleges a claim that sounds in
133
negligence, then Rule 8(a)’s lower threshold applies.
This
Section argues that the underlying principle relied on, sounding in fraud, is so vague that it has become meaningless. The
lack of meaning underlying the phrase “sounding in fraud” results in inconsistencies within and among both the circuits and
state courts.
There are two techniques for determining whether an allegation sounds in fraud. The Eleventh Circuit determined that
when the facts underlying a negligence claim are also “part of a
134
fraud claim,” the negligence claim sounds in fraud. This position holds that when fraud and negligent misrepresentation are
alleged side by side and there is an overlap of supporting facts,
135
both claims must be pled with particularity.
However, it
seems incorrect to determine the appropriate pleading standard of one claim by reference to separately alleged claims in the
complaint. Duty-based misrepresentation claims “do not become subject to heightened pleading simply because they are
based on the same set of operative facts as corresponding fraud
136
claims.” The Ninth Circuit holds that when a plaintiff alleges
a “unified course of fraudulent conduct . . . as the basis of the
137
claim,” the claim sounds in fraud. This second method of determining when a claim sounds in fraud can hardly be wrong,
but the circularity of reasoning gives it no meaningful force. It
is self-evident that when you allege fraud, the allegation
sounds in fraud.

“the major component involves significant delusion or confusion of a party,
whether intentional or not”); Lindner Dividend Fund, Inc. v. Ernst & Young,
880 F. Supp. 49, 57 (D. Mass. 1995) (“[T]his district has clearly held that Rule
9(b) applies to claims of negligent misrepresentations.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
133. E.g., Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir.
2003).
134. Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir.
2006).
135. Id.
136. Am. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 362 F.
Supp. 2d 744, 749 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
137. Vess, 317 F.3d at 1103.
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The difficulties in determining whether a claim sounds in
138
fraud are undeniable. Given the unhelpful articulations presented by the courts, there is need for a clear determining
standard for what it means for an allegation to sound in fraud.
Especially in the case of negligent misrepresentation claims,
which are closely related, yet distinct from fraud, without a
clear standard the plaintiff is left to guess whether particularity will be required for the claim. The current formulations result only in added confusion.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the asserted justifications for the heightened pleading requirement are an insufficient basis for its application to duty-based misrepresenta139
tion claims.
The modern equivalent of the historical
justification, desire for finality in settled transactions, does not
support applying the heightened pleading requirement to duty140
based claims. The primary policy underlying the heightened
pleading standard, protecting a defendant’s reputation and
141
goodwill, is likewise an insufficient basis. Unlike claims of
fraud, the dereliction of a duty does not carry the moral reprehensibility associated with an explicit intent to deceive; therefore this policy does not require particularized pleading for duty-based claims. Protecting defendants from meritless suits
filed for nuisance or settlement value is properly handled by
other Federal Rules, and to add that purpose to Rules governing pleading is not only redundant, but beyond the scope of
142
Rule 9(b). Finally, this analysis demonstrated that grounding
the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) on the desire for sufficient notice of the nature of the claim is unnecessary, as Rule
8(a)’s short and plain statement of the claim provides notice to
143
the defendant of the nature of the claim.
Although this analysis clearly leans away from requiring
particularized pleading for duty-based misrepresentation
claims, this Note does not propose that allegations of negligent
misrepresentation and fraud by omission are completely excluded from Rule 9(b). Many courts have spoken decisively on

138. See Fairman, supra note 29, at 301–05 (“Rule 9(b) is contagious. It infects other substantive areas with its heightened pleading standard.”).
139. See supra Parts II.A‒D.
140. See supra Part II.A.
141. See supra Part II.B.
142. See supra Part II.C.
143. See supra Part II.D.
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144

this matter and they are not all mistaken. However, the Circuit split regarding the correct pleading standard for negligent
misrepresentation claims and the inconsistencies in the required particulars for fraud by omission claims point to the lack
145
of a clear standard by which these claims should be judged.
Part III takes up this discussion and proposes a clear standard
for courts to use in applying heightened pleading to duty-based
misrepresentation claims.
III. SCIENTER IS REQUIRED FOR A CLAIM OR
ALLEGATION TO SOUND IN FRAUD
The growing divergence of authority over the proper pleading standard for duty-based misrepresentation claims leaves
the door open for the emergence of a clear pleading standard
that is broadly applicable. This Part critiques the formulations
of the standard used to determine that a claim sounds in fraud,
analyzes how it breeds inconsistencies in application, and ultimately concludes that inclusion of an allegation of scienter is
the correct determinant for whether a claim sounds in fraud.
A. SCIENTER: WHAT IT REALLY MEANS TO SOUND IN FRAUD
An articulable test is needed to differentiate those claims
that sound in fraud from those that do not. The best source of
guidance in structuring that test is analyzing the essential attributes of a fraud claim. Courts have made it clear that fraud
and other forms of misrepresentation are not co-extensive, ei146
ther in scope, liability, or pleading standard. As a result, that
feature which sets fraud apart from other misrepresentations
147
must be the determinant of fraud. The defining characteristic
of a fraud claim is scienter, the one element that sets fraud
148
apart from every other misrepresentation. An allegation that
sounds in fraud is an allegation of scienter concerning the misrepresentation. Scienter allegations are sufficiently particular
if supported by facts giving rise to a strong inference of fraudu-

144. See supra notes 68–72, 79–86, and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 68–72, 79–86, and accompanying text.
146. See supra Part I.
147. Reno v. Bull, 124 N.E. 144, 145 (N.Y. 1919) (“Fraud presupposes a
willful purpose resorted to with intent to deprive another of his legal
rights . . . . Fraud always has its origin in a purpose, but negligence is an
omission of duty minus the purpose.” (citations omitted)).
148. See supra Part I.C.
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149

lent intent.
This new standard is discordant in some respects with the
150
current constructions in practice. However, given the lack of
guidance inherent in the current formulations, that does not reflect poorly on the new standard, quite the opposite. That the
facts supporting a fraud claim also support a negligence claim
should not determine whether the negligence claim sounds in
fraud unless the facts that support the claim implicate intent to
151
deceive, manipulate, or mislead. The Ninth Circuit’s assessment is closer to accurate, however tautological. When a plaintiff alleges a unified course of fraudulent conduct, which by its
152
terms requires scienter, the claim will sound in fraud.
B. ALLEGATIONS OF DUTY-BASED MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS
SOMETIMES SOUND IN FRAUD
Neither negligent misrepresentation nor fraud by omission
153
contains an element of scienter, therefore, alleging that scienter is necessary for a claim to sound in fraud carries ramifications for the application of Rule 9(b) to these claims. It is deceptively simple to conclude that fraud by omission is
completely within the scope of Rule 9(b) because the claim
bears the name fraud, and the cases applying some form of par154
ticularity are numerous. Though fraud by omission carries
the magic word—fraud—it does not carry the critical element,
155
scienter. When applying this test, a fraud by omission claim
156
does not, by its terms, sound in fraud. Similarly, although
negligent misrepresentation is related to a fraud claim, as both
are based on misrepresentations, it does not, by its terms,
sound in fraud, as no showing of scienter is necessary to prevail
157
on the claim. Claims that do not in and of themselves require
158
a showing of scienter do not sound in fraud.
This is not to say that an allegation of negligent misrepre149. Icebox-Scoops v. Finanz St. Honoré, B.V., 676 F. Supp. 2d 100, 110
(E.D.N.Y. 2009).
150. See supra Part II.E (explaining the current techniques used to determine whether an allegation sounds in fraud).
151. See supra Part II.E.
152. See supra Part II.E.
153. See supra Parts I.D.1‒2.
154. See, e.g., supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1999).
156. See supra Part I.D.1.
157. See supra Part I.D.2.
158. See supra Part III.A.
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sentation or fraud by omission should never be held to a
heightened pleading standard. However, the application must
be tailored by the specific allegations in the case at hand. The
language of Rule 9(b) is “cast in terms of the conduct alleged,
and is not limited to allegations styled or denominated as
159
fraud.” While a plaintiff need allege no more than negligence
to proceed under a negligent misrepresentation claim, claims
that do rely upon averments of fraud, specifically scienter, are
160
subject to the test of Rule 9(b). Similarly, though an allegation of fraud by omission does not require pleading scienter, if
the allegations that form the basis of the claim include scienter,
heightened pleading is the correct standard for those allega161
tions. Nevertheless, when a claim includes allegations of both
fraudulent and non-fraudulent conduct, Rule 9(b)’s heightened
pleading standard applies only to allegations of fraud, not to
162
the complaint as a whole.
This standard comports with the Fifth Circuit’s determination that “[w]here averments of fraud are made in a claim in
which fraud is not an element, an inadequate averment of
fraud does not mean that no claim has been stated,” rather the
inadequate averments of fraud should be stricken from the
claim and the claim should be evaluated under the liberal no163
tice pleading standards of Rule 8(a). The combination of this
principle with the requirement that a claim that sounds in
fraud requires scienter gives plaintiffs at least two good options
in pleading duty-based misrepresentation claims. The plaintiff
can either allege intent to deceive and plead with particularity
or simply plead to satisfy the elements of the duty-based claim,
and bare notice pleading will apply. Given this understanding,
plaintiffs that allege a duty-based misrepresentation alongside
an actual fraud claim would be well-advised to plead conduct in
the alternative. Instead of basing the claims on the same set of
operative facts, they should plead separate facts for each claim,
especially as the conduct relates to the required state of mind
for each claim. This is recommended because where an inadequate fraud claim is so intertwined with a duty-based misrep159. Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004).
160. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Fraud can be averred by specifically alleging fraud, or by alleging facts that
necessarily constitute fraud (even if the word ‘fraud’ is not used).”).
161. Id. at 1107.
162. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 480 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1039 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
163. Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky’s Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th
Cir. 2001).
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resentation claim, a redaction that removes the allegations of
164
the fraud claim may leave behind no other viable claim.
C. FURTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE NECESSITY OF SCIENTER
FOR A CLAIM TO SOUND IN FRAUD
The following discussion of the statutory interpretation of
Rule 9(b) gives further credence to the proposition that an allegation requires scienter for it to sound in fraud. This Section
argues that the plain meaning of the statute applies only to allegations that are fraudulent at their core, requiring scienter.
In addition, the canon of construction, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius will be explored and applied to the two exceptions to the American liberal notice pleading system. The purpose of the Federal Rules as a whole will also be examined in
conjunction with heightened pleading and the requirement for
scienter if an allegation is to sound in fraud. Additional practical considerations that weigh in favor of an articulable standard for what it means to sound in fraud will also be set forth.
1. The Statutory Interpretation of Rule 9(b) Requires a
Precise Standard by Which Allegations Can Be Determined to
Sound in Fraud
By its own terms, Rule 9(b) applies only to allegations of
165
fraud and mistake. The plain meaning of the text of statutes
166
should be dispositive. Although the language at issue in this
case is a federal rule of procedure, such rules “have the force
167
and effect of a statute.” “[I]n interpreting a statute a court
should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others . . .
courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
168
means and means in a statute what it says there.” Since only
169
fraud and mistake are enumerated in the text, only allegations of fraud and mistake should be held to particularized
pleading. A claim that sounds in fraud will be held to the
heightened pleading standard. But, in a cause of action where a
164. Am. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 362 F.
Supp. 2d 744, 749 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
165. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
166. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) (“We should prefer the
plain meaning since that approach respects the words of Congress.”).
167. Rumsey v. George E. Failing Co., 333 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1964);
see also United States v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838, 839 (5th Cir.
1966).
168. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).
169. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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showing of scienter is not an element of the claim, the allegation sounds in fraud only where the intent to deceive, manipu170
late, or mislead are among the allegations.
Actual fraud
clearly contains the scienter component, it is an element of the
171
claim; fraudulent concealment does as well. Negligent misrepresentation and fraud by omission do not carry the scienter
172
requirement. These duty-based claims do not, on their face,
173
sound in fraud.
Courts are not permitted to add new requirements to Rule
9(b) simply because they like the effects of doing so; that is “a
job for Congress, or for the various legislative, judicial, and advisory bodies involved in the process of amending the Federal
174
Rules.” The plain meaning of the text clearly dictates that the
particularity requirement applies only to allegations of actual
fraud and mistake, no further justification is needed in light of
175
the statutory language for these causes of action. Just as
clearly, courts are not authorized to interpret Rule 9(b) to apply
to all duty-based misrepresentations in a manner that is inconsistent with the language of the Rule. Because Rule 9(b) does
not deal with “claims of fraud,” but rather with “allegations of
fraud,” a precise understanding of what an allegation of fraud
176
entails is necessary. Scienter fills the role of determining
177
when an allegation sounds in fraud. Therefore, an allegation
of scienter is required to necessitate particularity.
Although the plain meaning of the text appears clear, past
interpretation by the courts which expanded the particularity
requirement to duty-based misrepresentations created ambigu178
ity over what it means for a claim to sound in fraud. The test
proposed by this Note requires an allegation of scienter for the
claim to sound in fraud. This test is in harmony with the Supreme Court’s holding that Rule 9(b) imposes a particularity
requirement in exactly “two specific instances,” fraud or mis179
take, but not to unenumerated claims. “Expressio unius est
170. See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
172. See supra Parts I.D.1‒2.
173. See supra Part III.B.
174. Decker v. GlenFed, Inc., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
175. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
176. See id.
177. See supra Part III.A.
178. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
179. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
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180

exclusio alterius.” The expression of these two items leaves
other associated allegations excluded from the heightened
pleading standard.
On the other hand, it has been argued that “the canon that
expressing one item of a commonly associated group or series
excludes another left unmentioned is only a guide, whose fallibility can be shown by contrary indications that adopting a particular rule or statute was probably not meant to signal any ex181
clusion of its common relatives.” However, the adoption of
Rule 9(b) is itself an exception to a more general rule; that all
other claims may be made with a short and plain statement of
182
the claim that is plausible on its face. Express exceptions are
to be narrowly construed, and no other exceptions are to be im183
plied from the existence of one exception.
When interpreting the Federal Rules, the focus should be
184
on the legislature’s purpose in enacting them. The purpose
was to eliminate the fact-based pleading requirements and the
185
inherent booby traps within the previous pleading system.
The overall purpose was to allow more meritorious claims to be
186
heard in court. Since the purpose was to eliminate difficulties
to entry of the judicial system, courts should interpret Rule 9(b)
in a ways that will produce that result.
Strict statutory interpretation is called for here because
the Rule is not ambiguous, and even if it were, the ambiguous
language should be given its least inclusive reading because the
187
purpose of the Federal Rules is remedial. The notice pleading
180. Id. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. “As the
maxim [expressio unius est exclusio alterius] is applied to statutory interpretation, where a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and operation,
and the persons and things to which it refers are designated, there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions.” 2A SUTHERLAND’S
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (Norman J. Singer & J.D.
Shambie Singer eds., 7th ed. 2007).
181. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002).
182. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (requiring pleadings to provide a “short
and plain statement of the claim”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (creating a heightened pleading standard for allegations of fraud and mistake).
183. United States v. California., 504 F.2d 750, 754 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1974).
184. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (holding that where
the purpose of the law is consistent with the text, the text cannot be held to be
ambiguous).
185. See supra note 19.
186. See supra Part I.A.
187. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) (stating that remedial
statutes are to be liberally construed to achieve their remedial purpose).
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standard should be liberally construed to achieve the remedial
purpose, thereby narrowing the application of Rule 9(b), which
deters otherwise meritorious claims from passing the gateway
of pleading into the judicial system.
2. Practical Considerations Favor Precisely Defining What It
Means for an Allegation to Sound in Fraud
A precise definition of what it means to sound in fraud prevents the practical problems of litigation delays, dismissal of
meritorious claims, and uncertainty over the proper pleading
standard for allegations of misrepresentation. Supposed Rule
9(b) violations breed litigation delays because additional time is
188
required to amend the complaint. When an allegation does
not truly sound in fraud, but the presumed pleading standard
demands particularity, warranted claims will feasibly be dis189
missed.
Courts should adopt this standard because avoidable
amendments of complaints impose unnecessary costs and inef190
ficiencies on both the courts and party opponents. Litigation
delays are par for the course when a defendant asserts a Rule
9(b) violation. Where a pleading does not satisfy the heightened
requirements of Rule 9(b), the court should freely grant leave to
191
amend. Rule 15 advises that even after a party amends a
complaint once as a matter of course, leave to amend should be
192
freely granted where justice requires. The Supreme Court
has held that leave to amend should be freely granted where
there is an absence of any apparent prejudicial motive “such as
undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the
188. Cf. Caputo v. Pfizer, Inc., 267 F.3d 181, 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he failure to grant leave to amend is an abuse of discretion unless the plaintiff has
acted in bad faith or the amendment would be futile.”); Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We consistently have held that
[when dismissing for failure to comply with Rule 9(b)] leave to amend should
be granted unless the district court determines that the pleading could not
possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
189. Fairman, supra note 29, at 295.
190. ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2008)
(“Such a practice would dramatically undermine the ordinary rules governing
the finality of judicial decisions, and should not be sanctioned in the absence of
compelling circumstances.” (quoting James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 78 (1st Cir.
1983))).
191. See Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recognizing that courts almost always grant leave to amend to cure deficiencies in
pleading fraud).
192. FED. R. CIV. P. 15.
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Regardless of the motive, however, the ensuing
movant.”
amendment of the complaint results in both delays to the litigation and additional costs to the parties. Adopting this standard eliminates the requisite grant of leave to amend.
The application of Rule 9(b) to duty-based fraud claims
that do not ultimately sound in fraud also results in the dismissal of meritorious claims. Where the heightened pleading
standard requires more information than the plaintiff is able to
194
allege, dismissal results. In these cases, the plaintiff is required to make the case before discovery, which can be an im195
possible task. Though courts are generally more amenable to
a relaxed pleading standard where information required to
plead with particularity is uniquely within the control of the
196
defendant, they are not always so accommodating. Uncertainty reigns when particularity is applied arbitrarily, without
reference to an allegation sounding in fraud, or a clear defini197
tion for what it means to sound in fraud, as exemplified by
the Eames case. Uncertainty results in increased litigation, lit198
igation delays, and forum shopping. A clear standard defining
what it means to sound in fraud reduces these practical difficulties, while harmonizing with the majority of precedent concerning misrepresentation claims generally, and negligent misrepresentation claims in particular.
CONCLUSION
Courts are split over the proper pleading standard applicable to duty-based misrepresentation claims. This split demonstrates the courts’ failure to flesh out the meaning of sounding
in fraud. A claim that sounds in fraud requires particularized
pleading, while a claim that sounds in negligence may survive
without heightened pleading. The divergence over the proper
standard can be resolved by precisely defining what it means
for a claim or an allegation to sound in fraud. This Note pro193. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
194. See, e.g., Eames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 04-1324-KAJ,
2006 WL 2506640 (D. Del. Aug. 29, 2006), aff'd, 346 F. App'x 859 (3d Cir.
2009).
195. See, e.g., Abels v. Farmers Commodities Corp., 259 F.3d 910, 921 (8th
Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff should be allowed discovery before having
to meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b)).
196. See supra note 47.
197. See Fairman, supra note 29, at 297–99 (arguing that the application of
Rule 9(b) is inconsistent and uncertain).
198. See Sovern, supra note 57, at 164.
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poses that that definition centers on the requirement of scienter, the defining feature of an intentional fraud claim. Given
the varying standards and inconsistent application inherent in
current heightened pleading, adopting the requirement of scienter for a claim or allegation to sound in fraud would replace
uncertainty with clarity. Ultimately, more duty-based misrepresentation claims might survive to be adjudicated on the merits, which is precisely what the Federal Rules intend. This new
standard does not require courts to change the way they analyze misrepresentation claims for pleading purposes, just the
precision with which they do so. It also provides a clear standard for plaintiffs, and finally settles the pleading standard for
all duty-based misrepresentation claims.

